

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 032307

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD 1977 SPRING SESSION: GUIDANCE FOR US
DELEGATION

1. SUMMARY: THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES GENERAL GUIDANCE ON US POSTURE AT THE CCD AND ON SUBJECTS EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE SPRING SESSION, INCLUDING: COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR BAN ON NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, PROCEDURAL ISSUES AND COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, AND UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. END SUMMARY.

2. GENERAL - THE ADMINISTRATION HAS A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES UNDER REVIEW, INCLUDING THOSE UNDER RECENT CCD DISCUSSION. UNTIL THESE REVIEWS ARE COMPLETED, DECISIONS TAKEN, AND FURTHER POLICY GUIDANCE ISSUED, THE US DELEGATION IS LIKELY TO BE IN A HOLDING PATTERN, PARTICULARLY DURING THE EARLY PART OF THE SESSION. ANY ALLEGATIONS THAT THE US IS EMPLOYING STALLING TACTICS SHOULD BE FLATLY REJECTED. INSTEAD, THE US DELEGATION SHOULD SEEK TO CONVEY THE MESSAGE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION TAKES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT SERIOUSLY, IS ACTIVELY SEEKING TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES AND IDEAS, AND INTENDS TO MOVE AHEAD AGGRESSIVELY IN SEARCH OF SOLUTIONS TO THE MOST PRESSING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS. IN PARTICULAR, THE DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE TO OUR ALLIES THAT WE DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND SHOULD ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH A WESTERN CONFIDENTIAL

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CONSENSUS ON BOTH SUBSTANCE AND TACTICS TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IN THIS PROCESS WE DO NOT WISH TO DISCOURAGE ALTERNATE OPINIONS OR APPROACHES TO PROBLEMS, OR TO HIDE GENUINE DIFFERENCES. WE WISH TO HAVE A FULL UNDERSTANDING OF THE POSITIONS OF EACH ALLY AND TO IMPROVE THE CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES, INCLUDING JAPAN.

3. COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) - THE DELEGATION SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON THE CTB ISSUE. ON JANUARY 23 IN AN INTERVIEW, PRESIDENT CARTER SAID: QUOTE AS FAR AS NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS ARE CONCERNED, I WOULD LIKE TO PROCEED QUICKLY AND AGGRESSIVELY WITH A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. END QUOTE. ON FEBRUARY 8 THE PRESIDENT RETURNED TO THIS SUBJECT AND REPEATED HIS CTB COMMITMENT BUT NOTED IN ADDITION: QUOTE THE SOVIETS ARE INTERESTED IN USING NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES TO DIVERT THE COURSE OF A RIVER IN NORTHERN RUSSIA. I DON'T

THINK THEY NEED TO TEST ANY MORE. IF THEY WANT TO PUT THAT AS A PROVISIO IN THE AGREEMENT THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO GO AHEAD AND DIVERT THAT RIVER, I THINK THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING WE COULD NEGOTIATE AND LET US HAVE OBSERVERS THERE AND LEARN FROM THEM AND VICE VERSA. END QUOTE. IF ASKED ABOUT THESE STATEMENTS, THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOTE THAT THEY REFLECT THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG INTEREST IN A CTB. HOWEVER, DEL SHOULD AVOID EXPANDING ON ANY OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A CTB, SUCH AS WHETHER ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES MUST PARTICIPATE, WHETHER PNE'S WOULD BE ALLOWED, OR WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE MULTILATERAL. STATE 26783 IS ALSO RELEVANT. THE USG IS PROCEEDING EXPEDITIOUSLY WITH A REVIEW OF THE CTB ISSUE AND WE WILL EXPECT TO HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS SUBJECT AT AN EARLY DATE. THE DELEGATION SHOULD NOT SPECULATE ON WHAT APPROACH THE US MAY CHOOSE TO TAKE. THE DELEGATION MAY INDICATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE US IS CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF A ROLE FOR THE CCD IN DEVELOPING A CTB, BUT PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE CONFIDENTIAL

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CURRENT REVIEW SHOULD NOT COMMENT ON THE DIMENSIONS OR TIMING OF THAT ROLE. ASPECTS OF A CTB ADDRESSING THE QUESTION OF PNE'S ARE UNDER REVIEW. FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED.

4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) - AT THE COMMITTEE'S SPRING SESSION EXPECTATIONS WILL BE RATHER HIGH REGARDING PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER MOVEMENT ON CW. THESE EXPECTATIONS MAY BE BASED ON THE PERCEPTIONS OF SOME THAT PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED IN 1976, AT LEAST IN CLARIFYING MAJOR ISSUES, AS WELL AS SUGGESTIONS BY THE US AND OTHERS THAT THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION CONVENTION WOULD FACILITATE WORK ON OTHER ISSUES OF PRIORITY INTEREST. IN ADDITION, THERE IS LIKELY TO BE INTEREST IN FOLLOWING UP A SOVIET INDICATION AT THE UNGA OF POSSIBLE FLEXIBILITY REGARDING VERIFICATION OF CW STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION.

5. OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF US PARTICIPATION IN CCD CONSIDERATION OF CW DURING SPRING SESSION WILL BE TO DEMONSTRATE CONTINUING US COMMITMENT TO GOAL OF COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND US WILLINGNESS TO WORK ACTIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY TOWARD SOLUTION OF REMAINING PROBLEMS. THE APRIL 13, 1976 STATEMENT BY US REPRESENTATIVE, SETTING OUT OUR VIEWS ON CW ISSUES CCD SHOULD ADDRESS, PROVIDES BASIC SUBSTANTIVE GUIDANCE. DEL SHOULD SEEK THE VIEWS OF OTHER DELS AND ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP SUPPORT FOR US VIEWS ON QUESTIONS OF DEFINITION, SCOPE, AND VERIFICATION.

6. AS INDICATED AT THE PREVIOUS SESSION, WE PLAN TO COMMENT IN DETAIL ON UK DRAFT CW CONVENTION. (GUIDANCE TO BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.) DEL SHOULD ENCOURAGE OTHER DELS TO COMMENT BOTH INFORMALLY AND IN PLENARY STATEMENTS.

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7. DEL MAY INDICATE THAT USG HAS UNDERTAKEN A FRESH REVIEW OF CW ISSUES WITH A VIEW TO FACILITATING THE COMMITTEE'S WORK THIS YEAR. EVEN THOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ITALIANS, AND PERHAPS OTHERS, ARE INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING A NEGOTIATING WORKING GROUP, DEL SHOULD INDICATE THAT UNTIL OUR REVIEW IS COMPLETED USG WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO AGREE TO ESTABLISH SUCH A GROUP.

8. DEL SHOULD DEVOTE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO ENGAGING CCD IN SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION QUESTIONS. METHODS OF VERIFYING DESTRUCTION OF DECLARED STOCKS MIGHT BE SUGGESTED AS A STARTING POINT. AS PART OF EFFORT, DEL SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP INTEREST IN TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISITS TO FACILITIES RELEVANT TO CW VERIFICATION. DEL MAY MENTION POSSIBILITY OF INVITATION TO EXPERTS TO VISIT US FACILITIES AS PART OF SUCH AN EXCHANGE PROGRAM, BUT SHOULD AVOID COMMITTING THE US TO A UNILATERAL INVITATION.

9. IN ADDITION TO ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN MULTILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, USG WILL CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS BILATERALLY WITH USSR. DEL MAY INDICATE TO SOVIETS THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND USSR ON PRINCIPLES OF CW LIMITATION WHICH COULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A POSSIBLE JOINT INITIATIVE.

10. WE EXPECT THAT EARLY IN THE SESSION THE USSR WILL PROPOSE SETTING A DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF BILATERAL CW CONSULTATIONS, WHICH WERE AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE LAST SUMMER. IN OUR VIEW IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO HOLD ANOTHER ROUND OF TECHNICALLY-ORIENTED CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THE END OF THE SPRING CCD SESSION, PERHAPS IN LATE MARCH OR EARLY APRIL, BUT ONLY IF A SUITABLE AGENDA CAN BE AGREED UPON. HOWEVER, WE DOUBT THAT THE US WILL BE

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IN A POSITION DURING THE NEXT FEW MONTHS TO HOLD CONSULTATIONS TO DISCUSS A SPECIFIC JOINT INITIATIVE. DEL SHOULD REFER ANY SOVIET PROPOSAL ON CW CONSULTATIONS TO WASHINGTON FOR RESPONSE.

11. IN EARLY DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS, DEL SHOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF STATEMENTS ON CW VERIFICATION CONTAINED IN SOVIET MEMORANDUM PRESENTED AT UNGA IN FALL 1976. DEL SHOULD INDICATE OUR CONTINUING INTEREST IN RECEIVING SOVIET REACTIONS, ESPECIALLY THEIR VIEWS ON EFFECTIVE WAYS OF SOLVING VERIFICATION PROBLEMS AND ON FEASIBILITY OF TECHNICAL EXCHANGE VISITS. IN THIS CONNECTION, WHILE INDICATING OUR INTENTION TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGES INVOLVING EXPERTS FROM CCD MEMBER COUNTRIES GENERALLY, DEL MAY INDICATE THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN EXPLORING POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL EXCHANGE VISITS IN CONTEXT OF ONGOING BILATERAL CONSIDERATION OF BEST APPROACH TO EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS.

12. MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW) - LAST SEPTEMBER CCD DECIDED TO HOLD A THIRD SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS DURING ITS SPRING 1977 SESSION ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO BAN NEW WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS, AND THE SOVIETS MAY URGE THAT THE US SEND AN EXPERT. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS MAY ALSO REQUEST ANOTHER SERIES OF SEPARATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. DELEGATION SHOULD REPORT ANY APPROACHES ON THIS SUBJECT. DEL SHOULD AVOID COMMITTING THE USG TO ANY POSITION ON THESE QUESTIONS OR IN THE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES, DELEGATION SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING THEIR VIEWS PRIOR TO MAKING

ANY SUBSTANTIVE DECISIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN INFORMAL MEETINGS ON MDW. AS PART OF RATIONALE FOR BAN ON NEW MDW, COMMENTS OF SOVIET AND OTHER EASTERN CONFIDENTIAL

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BLOC EXPERTS DURING LAST AUGUST'S SERIES OF MEETINGS INCLUDED MENTION OF NEED TO COVER RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNIQUES ("GENETIC ENGINEERING") AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOLOGY, THUS IMPLICITLY CASTING DOUBT ON SCOPE OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (C). THE US POSITION IS THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS ARE COVERED BY THE BWC. THE US ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO MAINTAINING THE INTEGRITY OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS WHICH APPLY TO NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND TO OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION. FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF WHAT SOVIETS MEAN BY "MDW" IS NEEDED, BUT DEL SHOULD NOT RAISE

QUESTION UNTIL DEL HAS RECEIVED FURTHER GUIDANCE WHICH IS BEING PREPARED. IF OTHERS RAISE QUESTION DEL MAY STATE US POSITION, BUT SHOULD NOT ENGAGE IN FURTHER DISCUSSION.

13. STATUS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION (ENMOD) CONVENTION. THE UN SECRETARIAT IS PRESENTLY ENGAGED IN AUTHENTICATING THE VARIOUS TEXTS (ENGLISH, ARABIC, CHINESE, FRENCH, RUSSIAN, AND SPANISH) OF THE ENMOD CONVENTION, AND USG OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN SUED BY AN ENVIRONMENTAL GROUP ALLEGING THAT AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED BEFORE THE USG ENTERED NEGOTIATIONS, AND ASKING THAT THE USG BE ENJOINED FROM SIGNING THE CONVENTION UNTIL A STATEMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED. WHEN THE LEGAL ISSUES HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED, THE USG WILL BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE QUESTION OF SIGNING THE ENMOD CONVENTION TOGETHER WITH THE USSR AND OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET POSITION IS THAT SIGNING SHOULD TAKE PLACE BELOW THE FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL, BY "SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES," WITH DIALOG ON THIS POINT TO BE CARRIED ON IN NEW YORK.

14. SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS
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REGARDING US PARTICIPATION IN THE SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP WILL BE PROVIDED SEPARATELY.

15. RADIOLOGICAL WARFARE (RW). ON NOVEMBER 18, 1976, FORMER ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE, SPEAKING IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE UNGA, SUGGESTED THAT QUOTE AN APPROPRIATE FORUM, SUCH AS THE CCD, CONSIDER AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD PROHIBIT THE USE OF RADIO-ACTIVE MATERIALS AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS UNQUOTE. IF OTHERS RAISE THE QUESTION, DEL MAY STATE THAT THE USG WILL BE

CONSIDERING THE QUESTION OF MAKING KNOWN ANY FURTHER VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT OF RW. IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES, DEL SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD CONSULT WITH THEM BEFORE MAKING ANY NEW POLICY OR PUBLIC STATEMENT.

16. PROCEDURAL ISSUES - DE-AILED GUIDANCE ON PROCEDURAL ISSUES IS CONTAINED IN POSITION PAPER WHICH WAS PREPARED AND ISSUED FOR SPRING 1976 SESSION. THIS GUIDANCE, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO LIMIT POSSIBLE CHANGES IN CCD ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES THAT WOULD MAKE THE CCD LESS ATTRACTIVE TO US AS A NEGOTIATING FORUM, IS STILL VALID. VALUE OF CCD TO US DEPENDS HEAVILY ON THREE FACTORS: (1) RULE

THAT ALL DECISIONS ARE BY CONSENSUS, (2) THE CONTINUITY OF ITS SELECT AND LIMITED MEMBERSHIP, AND (3) ITS AUTONOMY VIS-A-VIS THE UN. IN ANY DISCUSSIONS OF CHANGING CCD PROCEDURES OR STRUCTURE, THESE THREE ELEMENTS SHOULD BE TREATED AS BEING EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FROM US POINT OF VIEW. CONSENSUS RULE ENSURES THAT RECOMMENDATIONS BY CCD REQUIRE US APPROVAL. ITS MEMBERSHIP, WHICH INCLUDES RELATIVELY HIGH PROPORTION OF US ALLIES AND FAIRLY MODERATE NONALIGNED STATES, AND THE CONTINUITY OF THESE STATES IN THE CCD ENCOURAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERTISE AND A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO ISSUES. AUTONOMY OF CCD PERMITS IT TO TREAT UN RESOLUTIONS AS NON-BINDING

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RECOMMENDATIONS, AND TO CONSIDER ITEMS (E.G. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS) NOT SANCTIONED BY UNGA RESOLUTIONS. WITH THESE CAVEATS IN MIND, DEL MAY ADOPT GENERAL APPROACH SUPPORTING REVIEW OF EXISTING CCD PROCEDURES AND MAY PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN CONSIDERING POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WOULD PRESERVE ELEMENTS OF CURRENT SYSTEM WE SEE AS ESSENTIAL. HOWEVER, DEL SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT SOVIETS PRESENTLY CONSIDER CO-CHAIRMANSHIP ESSENTIAL TO THEIR SUPPORT OF CCD, AND THAT USG WOULD WISH TO TAKE SOVIET VIEWS INTO ACCOUNT IN CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION. OVERALL, DEL SHOULD NOT AGREE TO ANY SPECIFIC CHANGES IN CCD PROCEDURES, HOWEVER, WITHOUT TIME FOR FURTHER EVALUATION IN DEPARTMENT OF RELATION OF SUGGESTED CHANGES WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN REGARD TO OVERALL PROCEDURES OF CCD. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT PROCEDURAL REFORMS SHOULD NOT BE TREATED INDIVIDUALLY. RATHER, IT IS MORE DESIRABLE TO CONDUCT COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF CCD PROCEDURES. IF THERE IS CONSENSUS DECISION TO MAKE CHANGES, THESE SHOULD BE CODIFIED, ALONG WITH ALL OTHER COMMITTEE PROCEDURES. GENERAL REVIEW AND CODIFICATION PRINCIPLE SHOULD HELP HOLD LINE AGAINST PIECEMEAL REFORMS AND PROVIDE BASIS FOR ARGUING THAT CCD CAN TAKE CARE OF ITS OWN PROCEDURAL ISSUES WITHOUT OUTSIDE (UNGA OR AD HOC) INTERFERENCE. NEVERTHELESS, DEL SHOULD UNDERSTAND

THAT QUESTION OF REVISION OF CCD PROCEDURES MAY BE PART OF A BROADER SET OF INITIATIVES WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED AT THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) IN MAY-JUNE 1978. THERE MAY BE INTEREST AT THE UN SSOD IN REVISING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CCD AND UN OR EVEN IN CREATING AN ALTERNATIVE NEGOTIATING FORUM. DEL POSITION ON CCD PROCEDURAL REFORM, ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD NOT PREJUDGE US POSITION NEXT YEAR AT SSOD, AND SHOULD MANIFEST AN APPEARANCE OF FLEXIBILITY TOWARD THE QUESTION OF REFORMING CCD PROCEDURES. IF THERE IS ONLY LIMITED INTEREST ON PART OF OTHER CCD DELS IN PURSUING

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PROCEDURAL QUESTION THIS YEAR, US DEL SHOULD NOT PRESS
ISSUE.

17. COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM - LAST SEPTEMBER
THE CCD DECIDED TO "CONSIDER" QUESTION OF "A COMPREHENSIVE
PROGRAM DEALING WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF THE
CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND GENERAL AND COMPLETE
DISARMAMENT UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL,"
DURING 1977 SESSION. WE ANTICIPATE THAT DISCUSSION
OF SUCH A PROGRAM WILL CENTER ON SETTING A PROGRAM
OF PRIORITIES, AND ATTEMPTS TO DEVISE A TIME-TABLE
FOR THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. SUBJECTS WHICH MAY BE
RAISED IN CCD FORUM RANGE FROM DELINEATING PROGRESS
TO DATE, TO LIMITING OR HALTING CURRENT AND NEW
ARMAMENTS (INCLUDING MILITARY BASES AND ARMED FORCES),
TO REDUCTIONS AND ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR AND
EVENTUALLY ALSO CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS. THE FORM THAT
SUGGESTIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM
MIGHT TAKE ARE LIKELY TO BE: (1) SUBSTANTIVE - REVISING
THE CCD AGENDA, SETTING PRIORITIES, ETC., AND (2)
PROCEDURAL - REVISING CCD'S WORKING METHODS. WITH REGARD
TO REVISIONS TO THE AGENDA AND ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES,
RELATIVE US FLEXIBILITY MAY BE BOTH USEFUL AND NECESSARY,
IN CONTRAST TO US FIRMNESS ON OTHER ISSUES (E.G.,
REFUSAL TO SET NEGOTIATING DEADLINES OR TO ESTABLISH
A PERMANENT NEGOTIATING SUBCOMMITTEE). OUR OBJECTIVE
IN REGARD TO THE AGENDA IS TO PRESERVE CCD'S
FLEXIBILITY TO DISCUSS A BROAD RANGE OF TOPICS WITHOUT
HAVING RESULTS DETERMINED IN ADVANCE. DEL MAY THEREFORE
EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR REVISED AGENDA AS WELL AS
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR SETTING PRIORITIES WITH OTHER
DELS AND REPORT TO DEPARTMENT. WITH REGARD TO SUGGESTED
REVISIONS IN CCD'S WORKING METHODS (E.G., ALLOCATING
TOPICS TO SPECIFIC MEETINGS, SCHEDULING INFORMAL
MEETINGS, ESTABLISHING DEADLINES, CREATING A PERMANENT
NEGOTIATING BODY) DEL SHOULD CONSULT DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS
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IN SEPARATE CLEARED POSITION PAPER AND REPORT ALL
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO DEPARTMENT. FINALLY, DEL SHOULD

BEAR IN MIND THAT, REGARDLESS OF OUTCOME OF CCD
DISCUSSIONS ON THESE ISSUES, SAME OR SIMILAR INITIATIVES
REGARDING COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM ARE ALMOST

CERTAIN TO BE BROUGHT UP DURING UNGA SPECIAL SESSION
ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD) IN MAY-JUNE 1978. US POSITION
ON COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM DURING CCD SHOULD
NOT PREJUDGE US POSITION AT SSOD.

18. UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT - WITH REGARD
TO PREPARATIONS FOR THE UNSSOD SCHEDULED FOR MAY-JUNE
1978, USG INTENDS TO ADOPT A POSITIVE POSTURE AND
TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, IN ORDER TO AVOID
CONFRONTATION AND BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE,
FREE OF POLEMICS AND DESIGNED TO TREAT SERIOUS ISSUES
IN A SERIOUS AND REALISTIC MANNER. IF QUESTIONED ABOUT
SSOD, DEL SHOULD INDICATE US WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE
IN PREPARATORY STAGES AND SSOD ITSELF IN THIS SPIRIT
AND SHOULD URGE OTHERS TO FOLLOW SUIT, INDICATING THAT
AN OVERLY CONTENTIOUS CONFERENCE WOULD BE IN NO ONE'S
INTEREST, WOULD FAIL, AND WOULD SET BACK CHANCES FOR
PROGRESS ON MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT ISSUES.
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